Institutional Quality, Income Inequality, and Economic
Growth
In Latin American Countries
Courtney Pomera

Abstract:
This paper investigates the possibility of the institutional quality of a country having an effect on
income inequality and economic growth in Latin American Countries. The study incorporates the
gini variable and growth rates of GDP in each country to examine the influence of corruption on
the various countries throughout Latin America. Looking at previous research it has been found
that corruption is positively correlated with income inequality and negatively correlated with
economic growth. The variable for corruption in this study however measures the control of
corruption in each country, so we will be looking at the institutional quality and its effects. It
would be expected that control of corruption would have a negative relationship with income
inequality and a positive relationship with economic growth.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
According to the Transparency International’s latest Corruption Perception Index, twothirds of the Latin America region fall in the bottom half of the list, meaning they are among the
world’s most corrupt nations. Although, recently the many countries in the region have been
trying to fight corruption and put a stop to it but corruption remains deep-rooted and shows no
signs of improving anytime soon. According to Bhansali (2010) the lack of high-quality public
services in this region and the rebuilding of citizen trust are two key problems that are in the way
of the anti-corruption policies.
Corruption can have opposing effects on countries. This study aims to enhance the
understanding of the effects institutional quality, mainly looking at the control of corruption, has
on economic growth and income inequality in Latin American countries. According to GymiahBrempong (2001) corruption distorts incentives and market signals which leads to the
misallocation of resources and therefore slows down economic growth. From a policy
perspective, this analysis is important because if corruption has a large impact on the economic
growth than it could reveal that more countries should be pursuing anti-corruption policies or
taking a more active role in fighting corruption. The relevance of this study is that many Latin
American countries have been struck with political and economic disorder due to corruptive
political leaders and corrupt businesses involving drugs.
The World Bank has reported that putting an end to corruption is an important hurdle that
must be overcome for sustainable economic growth. Some of the anti-corruption tools the World
Bank has offered are comprehensive diagnosis and empirical studies, civic groups engagement
promotion, and coalitions building and training. Right now it is believed that corruption is the
cause of the structural weaknesses in many of the countries in the Latin American Region. The

World Bank has also suggested that the anti-corruption strategies should revolve around five key
elements. The elements are (1) increasing political accountability, (2) strengthening civil society
participation, (3) creating a competitive private sector, (4) developing institutional restraints on
power, and (5) improving public sector management.
The poor income distribution in these Latin American Countries can also be caused by
the corruption or the poor institutional quality in the countries. In 2003 the World Bank Vice
President for Latin America and the Caribbean has stated that this region was one with the
greatest inequality in respect to incomes. This paper will try and help and enhance the research
and knowledge on how the institutional quality, mainly focusing on how well corruption is
controlled, and income inequality in countries in the Latin America Region are related.
This paper was guided by three research objective that differ from other studies: First, it
expands on previous research on Latin American Countries and will focus on 18 countries from
the year 2002 to the year 2010; Second, it incorporates information used to examine the
influence of countries control over corruption on both economic growth and income inequality;
Last, it analyzes how this certain geographical area has some of the largest corrupt nations and
how the different countries throughout the region may be impacted differently. This paper will
allow us to expand our knowledge on the effects of corruption using panel data model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 shows trends on the given topic.
Section 3 gives a brief literature review. Section 4 outlines the empirical model, data and
estimation methodology. Finally, section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results. This is
followed by a conclusion in section 6.
2.0 TREND

We will begin by looking at how Latin America compares to the rest of the world when it
comes to corruption. Then we will see how the different countries with in the region compare to
one another. We will also compare the Latin America region to seven other regions of the world.
And finally we will look at Latin America’s GDP Growth from 2003 to 2011.
Figure 1 shows that CPIA transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public
sector rating in the Latin American Region compared to the rest of the world. The rating is based
on a scale from 1 to 6, 1 being lowest and 6 being the highest. From 2005 to 2010 the worlds
rank remained constant at 2.9 but then increased slightly in 2011. The Latin America region was
ranked 3.4 from 2005 to 2008 but then increased in 2009 to 3.5 and then decreased again to 3.4
in 2010 and 2011.
Figure 1: CPIA Rating World vs. Latin America Region

Source: World Bank Database
Figure 2 shows the Transparency international corruption-perception index for Latin
America in the year 2002. Chile is the least corrupt Latin American country and Paraguay being
the most corrupt out of the 19 countries shown. Out of the 19 countries only two have a ranking

above 5 and Uruguay is just over the midpoint with a 5.10 ranking. This reveals that most Latin
American countries are more corrupt than “clean” as the graph depicts.
Figure 2: CPI Index in 2002

Source: World Development by: Mitchell A. Seligson
Figure 3 reveals the control of corruption for the 19 Latin American countries listed in
the chart. It is based on a ranking from 0 to 10. 10 is having the best control and 0 having no
control. Chile has the highest ranking of 8.99 and Ecuador the lowest at 1.26.
Figure 3: World Bank Institute Corruption-Control Index 2001/2002

Source: World Development by: Mitchell A. Seligson

Figure 4 Portrays how the Latin America region is one of the lowest ranked regions in
corruption control. Western Europe and North America have the highest rank for corruption
control and Former Soviet Union has the lowest rank.
Figure 4: Control of Corruption by Region

Source: World Bank- Against Corruption Articles
Figure 5 shows as a whole the Latin American growth by GDP, as an annual percentage.
In 2007 GDP growth decreased to a low of -1.6% in 2009 due to the global financial crisis. It
then increased to 6% in 2010 and then began to decrease again.
Figure 5: GDP Growth (%) 2003-2011

Source: World Bank Database
As we can see Latin America is one of the more corrupt regions in the world. And in the
last few years their GDP growth has fluctuated. The following literature review will shed some

light on how corruption, or how reputable the institutional quality is in the region, can have an
effect on the income inequality in Latin America as well as how it affects the economic growth
in those countries.
3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature reveals that corruption does have an effect on both economic growth and
income distribution. Corruption is defined as illegally enriching public agents or officials who
obtain larger benefits, or bear a lower share of public costs. (Davoodi et al., 2001; Li et al., 2000)
Gyimah-Brempong (2001) stated that corruption slows economic growth because it distorts
incentives and market signals leading to misallocation of resources. Davoodi et al. (2001) also
reveals that corruption disrupts the government’s role in asset allocation. Others believe that
corruption occurs because the government has a monopoly over resources that are needed by
private citizens. (Husted, 1999)
Li et al. (2000) explains that, based on empirical literature, corruption and growth have a
negative relationship, meaning corruption causes slow growth. According to Mauro (1995),
bureaucracies can delay the distribution of permits and licenses, which therefore slows down
advances in technology. Corruption decreases private investment, thus decreasing economic
growth. (Gyimah-Brempong, 2001; Mauro, 1995) According to Seligson (2002), among
countries in which bribery or corruption was high and unpredictable, the rate of investment was
half of what it was in low-corruption countries. Gyimah-Brempong (2001) found, when looking
at African countries, a one unit increase in the corruption index decreases the growth rate of
GDP by between 0.75 and 0.9 percentage points, and of per capita income by between 0.39 and
0.41 percentage points. It was also found that corruption decreases the inflow of foreign direct

investment into the country. (Gyimah-Brempong, 2001) Li et al. (2000) also found that
corruption and growth are negatively related, but that the relationship was not very significant.
Corruption also leads to income inequality. Davoodi et al. (2001) argues that the impact of
corruption on income inequality and poverty is significant and found that a worsening in the
corruption index of a country by one standard deviation increases in the Gini variable by 11
points, which is significant. Gyimah-Brempong (2001) states corruption affects the Gini variable
through government consumption. According to Li et al. (2000) inequality is low when levels of
corruption are high or low, but inequality is high when corruption is in-between, therefore the
relationship between the two is an inverted U-shape. Gyimah-Brempong’s (2001) research on
Africa argues that the poor bear the brunt of economic effects of corruption. But the benefits of
corruption are most likely to go to the more connected, higher-income individuals in the society.
(Davoodi et al., 2001) Davoodi (2001) also argues that because corruption increases inequality,
the negative implications from that is harmful to both growth and equity. Corruption also causes
public services to be focused toward those who pay bribes, which is mostly high-income
individuals, and denying those services to those who do not accept bribes. This therefore, results
in unequal and inferior services to many. (Seligson, 2002)
The factors that are said to increase corruption are low levels of law enforcement, lack of
understanding of the rules, of clearness and accountability in public actions, too much monopoly
given to public officials, and the large size of the public sector. (Gyimah-Brempong, 2001) In
Latin America corruption has distinctive effects; it has a greater effect on inequality compared to
other continents. (Li et al., 2000) Li et al. (2000) states that Latin American countries when
government spending is higher in Latin American countries, corruption is also more harmful for
growth.

4.0 DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
4.1 DATA
The study uses annual data from 2002 to 2012 for eighteen Latin American Countries.
Data was obtained from The World Bank and The Worldwide Governance Indicators. The
eighteen Latin American countries are Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela, RB. Summary statistics for the data are provided in
Table 1.

Table 1 Summary Statistics
Variable
Primary Education
Secondary Education
Exports
GDP growth
Government consumption
Gini
FDI net inflow
Per Capita Income
Control of Corruption
Government effectiveness
Political Stability
Rule of Law

Obs
162
162
160
162
160
121
162
160
162
162
162
162

Mean

Std. Dev.

5.833333
5.783951
5.008059
4.286642
4.166737
52.34653
4.80E+09
2.711967
44.07963
45.21975
36.51296
36.55247

0.50155
0.531249
7.882109
3.979828
4.501902
4.309991
9.00E+09
4.497306
21.83207
18.76832
19.88709
20.94176

Min

Max

4
6
5
7
-15.96882 30.43911
-10.89448 18.28661
-12.5592 18.0551
44.49
61.33
-3.05E+09 5.33E+10
-16.3296 15.25617
2.4
91.7
10.7
87.8
1
82.2
1.4
89.5

4.2 EMIPRICAL MODEL
Following Gyimah-Brempong (2001) this study adapted and modified the two models
used in the paper. For the model on economic growth we have added FDI_NETINFLOW,
CTRL_CORR, GOV_EFFEC, and POL_STAB. The model will have a total of 10 variables.

The Model could be written as follows:

𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺ℎ = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶

+ 𝛽𝛽5 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽8 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽9 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
+ 𝜇𝜇

𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺ℎ is the annual percentage of GDP growth each year. 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺ℎ is the dependent

variable in the model. The rest of the variables are the independent variables. 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 is

the years of education to measure human capital. The variable 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is the adjusted net

national income growth for each year, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 is per capita income, and 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is

government consumption. 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is the Foreign Direct Investments that come into

Latin America as a percentage of GDP. 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 is the amount of exports of goods and services.

The variables 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ,𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 , and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 , all represent the governments control of

corruption. These data sets were obtained by The Worldwide Governance Indicators and each

country for each year was given a ranking between 0 and 100, 0 corresponding to the lowest rank
or the lowest amount of control. The lower the number the less control the government has on
corruption. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 represents the actual control the government has on corruption, where as

𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 is how effective the government is in general which would include corruption, and

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 is political stability. Because politics is often overcome with corruption political stability

is also a good measure on how institutional quality can effect economic growth in these
particular countries.

The second model also follows Gyimah-Brempong (2001). Not only did we use the
variables in the model followed by Gyimah-Brempong (2001) but we added FDI_NETINFLOW
and CTRL_CORR, GOV_EFFEC, and POL_STAB to this model as well.
The model could be written as follows:
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
+ 𝛽𝛽5 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽8 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
+ 𝛽𝛽9 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝜇𝜇

𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 is the gini coefficient which measures income inequality. It is the dependent variable in the

model. 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺ℎ is the annual percentage of GDP growth each year. 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 and
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 both represent years of education where secondary education is more

advanced years of schooling. 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 is the per capita income. And as stated in the previous

model 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is government consumption and 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is the Foreign Direct

Investments that come into the Latin America as a percentage of GDP. The variables 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ,

𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 , 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 , all represent the governments control of corruption and institutional quality,

as was stated in the previous model.

5.0 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The empirical results for the first model are presented in Table 2. The empirical
estimation shows the positive relationship between control of corruption and economic growth in
Latin American countries. Meaning, that if these countries can increase their control over
corruption than they will have higher economic growth, which we measured using annual GDP
growth. Looking at the model we can see that an increase of control of corruption by 1 unit

would cause GDP growth to increase by .01 units, ceteris paribus. It was interesting to see
however that government effectiveness and political stability had a negative relationship to GDP
growth. This could be because political systems do tend to be corrupt and therefore lead to a
decrease in economic growth.
Table 2: Regression Results for Economic Growth
VARIABLE
CONSTANT
PRIMARY_EDUC
INCOME
PCINCOME
GOVCONS
FDI_NETINFLOW
EXPORTS
CTRL_CORR
GOV_EFFEC
POL_STAB
R2
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

GDP GROWTH
1.429158
(1.513472)
0.090055
(0.251956)
0.091846***
(0.027325)
0.673979***
(0.037333)
0.037879
(0.025507)
-1.53E-11
(1.48E-11)
0.083122***
(0.0000)
0.012155
(0.011216)
-0016163
(0.013228)
-0.0042898
(0.007459)
0.911434
0.906120
0.00

These results show that corruption does affect the economic growth of these 18 countries.
Although we used the control of corruption and how effective the government and political
systems are we can presume that if the results show better control of corruption leads to higher
economic growth then we can also say that less control of corruption, or higher corruption in
these areas actually leads to lower economic growth.

The R2, which measures the goodness of fit, for this model was 0.91, which indicates a
good model. However, only 3 variables turned out to be statistically significant. Those variables
were EXPORTS, PCINCOME, and INCOME. All three were significant at the 1% level.
Appendix B reveals the expected signs of the variables. It was predicted that FDI inflows
would have a positive relationship to GDP growth however there was actually a negative
relationship. According to a paper by Li and Liu (2004), there is a strong negative interaction
effect of FDI with the technology gap on economic growth in developing countries which could
explain why we got a negative relationship in this model. Also, government effectiveness and
political stability were predicted to have a positive relationship with economic growth however it
turned out to be a negative relationship. Government consumption was also predicted to have a
negative relationship to economic growth but it turned out to be positive this could be because
the consumption by the government could have been on goods and services that improve the
well-being of the country, such as advances in technology that could lead to an increase in
economic growth.
The empirical results for the second model are presented in Table 3. The empirical
estimation shows the negative relationship between control of corruption and income inequality.
This reveals that if the government increases there control over corruption income inequality in
Latin American countries will decrease. Looking at the model we can see that a 1 unit increase in
the control of corruption will actually lead to a 0.105 unit decrease in income inequality, holding
other factors constant.

Table 3: Regression Results for Income Inequality
VARIABLE
CONSTANT
GDP_GROWTH
PRIMARY_EDUC
SECONDARY_EDUC
PCINCOME
GOVCONS
FDI_NETINFLOW
CTRL_CORR
GOV_EFFEC
POL_STAB
R2
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

GINI
92.12194
(8.017268)
0.627844***
(0.226187)
-5.675814***
(0.854676)
-0.838853
(0.725523)
-0.617383***
(0.204160)
-0.039712
(0.069309)
-1.83E-10***
(4.86E-11)
-0.105653***
(0.032706)
0.100981**
(0.038947)
-0.054074**
(0.022185)
0.511395
12.90860
0.00

These results reveal that corruption does negatively impact income inequality. If the
control of corruption was to increase then the gini coefficient would decrease, which means
lower income inequality. Because many political systems are corrupt or contribute to the
corruption of countries it is not surprising to see that political stability and income inequality
(represented by the gini coefficient) have a negative relationship. The more stable the political
system then the less income inequality in the country.
The R2 for this model is 0.51, meaning that 51% percent of the variations in the variable
gini are explained. Of the nine independent variables 7 are statistically significant.

GDP_GROWTH, FDI_NETINFLOW, PCINCOME, CTRL_CORR, and PRIMARY_EDUC are all
significant at the 1% level. GOV_EFFEC and POL_STAB are significant at the 5% level.
GDP growth and government effectiveness were expected to have negative relationships
with income inequality however they had positive relationships. The positive relationship
between GDP growth and income inequality could be that although there is growth in the
economy, the effects of the growth could still be affecting only certain classes of people, making
the income gap between the rich and the poor larger. FDI inflows, per capita income, primary
and secondary education, and government consumption were all predicted to have positive
relationships with income inequality but actually turned out to be negatively related. The FDI
inflow’s negative relationship with income inequality could be interpreted such that the openness
of trade and globalization has actually increased income inequality in this region rather than
decrease the income inequality.
6.0 CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In summary, the more control over corruption the higher economic growth and the less
income inequality in a country. The results in this paper reveal that countries in the Latin
American area can increase growth by implementing more policies that decrease corruption.
According to the data collected, Latin America is made up of a majority of countries with high
rates of corruption and little control over it. With the effective implementation of Anticorruption
policies this paper reveals that not only will economic growth increase but the income inequality
in these areas will also decrease. If the government takes a leading role in controlling for
corruption as well as create a competitive economy then the economic growth in this region
should increase. Also, if the countries restrain the power of certain officials and people income
inequality should decrease.

There were limitations while researching this particular topic. First, many Latin
American countries could not be used in this paper because there was not enough data. Also, we
could only go as far back as 2002. This was because for the 18 countries that were chosen, not all
data points were available for each variable before the year 2002. Also, this research was only
done over the span of 4 months. With more time we could have gone more in-depth on the topic.
Future Research could increase the time span of the data as well as increase the number
of countries. Instead of looking at 2002 to 2010, future research could go farther back as well as
up to the most present year. Also, they could include all Latin American Countries not just the 18
that this paper included. Including different variables or other measures of corruption could also
be useful in future research.

Acronym

Appendix A: Variable Description and Data Source
Description
Data Source

GDP_GROWTH

GDP growth

The World Bank

FDI_NETINFLOW

Foreign direct investment: net
inflows

The World Bank

EXPORTS

Exports of goods and services

The World Bank

CTRL_CORR

Control of Corruption

Worldwide Governance
Indicators

GOV_EFFEC

Government effectiveness

Worldwide Governance
Indicators

POL_STAB

Political Stability

Worldwide Governance
Indicators

INCOME

Adjusted net income

The World Bank

GOVCONS

Government consumption

The World Bank

GINI

Gini coefficient

The World Bank

PCINCOME

Per capita income

The World Bank

PRIMARY_EDUC

Primary education in years

The World Bank

SECONDARY_EDUC

Secondary education in years

The World Bank

Acronym
GDP_GROWTH
PRIMARY_EDUC
INCOME
PCINCOME
GOVCONS
FDI_NETINFLOW
EXPORTS
CTRL_CORR
GOV_EFFEC
POL_STAB
Acronym
GINI
GDP_GROWTH

Appendix B: Variable and Expected Signs
Variable Description
What it Captures
Annual percentage of
GDP growth
Primary education in
years
Adjusted net national
income annual % growth
Per capita income
annual % growth
Government
consumption annual %
growth
FDI that come into the
country as a percentage
of GDP
Amount exports of goods
and services
Ranking from 0 to 100, 0
being the lowest
Ranking from 0 to 100, 0
being the lowest
Ranking from 0 to 100, 0
being the lowest
Variable Description

The economic growth from year to
year
Amount of Human Capita

GINI index for income
inequality

range from 0 to 100: 0 represents
perfect equality and 100 represents
perfect inequality
The economic growth from year to
year
How well the population is educated

Annual percentage of
GDP growth
PRIMARY_EDUC
Primary education in
years
SECONDARY_EDUC Secondary education in
years
PCINCOME
Per capita income
annual % growth
GOVCONS
Government
consumption annual %
growth
FDI_NETINFLOW
FDI that come into the
country as a percentage
of GDP
CTRL_CORR
Ranking from 0 to 100, 0
being the lowest

Expected
Sign
+

Income of country as a whole

+

Income per person

+

How much the government is
spending

-

Foreign direct investments coming
into the country

+

One side of trade

+

Lower the ranking the less control
over corruption
Lower the ranking the less
government effectiveness
Lower the ranking the less political
stability
What it Captures

+
+
+
Expected
Sign

+

How well the population is educated

+

Income per person

+

How much the government is
spending

+

Foreign direct investments coming
into the country

+

Lower the ranking the less control
over corruption

-

GOV_EFFEC
POL_STAB

Ranking from 0 to 100, 0
being the lowest
Ranking from 0 to 100, 0
being the lowest

Lower the ranking the less
government effectiveness
Lower the ranking the less political
stability

-
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